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Abstract
This thesis revisits the relationship between ethnic fractionalization and cor-
ruption in Africa. An earlier literature argues that ethnic fractionalization
leads to corruption via mechanisms involving ethnic favoritism. In this study,
an alternative theory suggests that the casual relationship runs in the other
direction: when the political system is corrupt and fails to deliver security,
voters will fall back on ethnic institutions. This creates the stronger patterns
of ethnic identity and ethnic voting that we see in countries considered to
be ethnically fractionalized. Conducting three analyses  an OLS regression
and an instrumental variable design on the country level, and an individual
level analysis on party preferences from the Afrobarometer dataset  the
thesis ﬁnds support for the alternative theory.
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1 | Introduction
The causal relationship between ethnic fractionalization and corruption in
contemporary political science generally points to that the ethnic fractional-
ization cause outcomes such as lower welfare provisions, less economic growth
and a higher degree of corruption (Easterly, 1997; Mauro, 1998; La Porta,
Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999; Alesina, Devleeschauwer, East-
erly, Kurlat, & Wacziarg, 2003). I.e., ethnic institutions are still relevant,
and the state generally functions better in ethnic homogenous countries.
Multi-ethnic countries should, therefore, have a higher degree of corruption
and lower degree of both welfare provisions and economic growth.
Most available evidence points towards a correlation between ethnic frac-
tionalization and corruption. However, previous scholars have devoted little
attention to explain why the causal direction leads from ethnic fractionaliza-
tion to corruption, or the possibility of a spurious relationship between ethnic
fractionalization and corruption. It is plausible that a pre-existing level of
corruption could lead people to embrace ethnic institutions above dysfunc-
tional state institutions, where ethnic institutions can either be ethnicity as
a social institution or more formal organizations, such as tribal councils, re-
ligious congregations or recurrent sit-downs between elders. This thesis will
investigate the hypothesis of a causal direction from corruption to ethnic
politicization, where ethnic politicization means that ethnic diﬀerences con-
stitute dividing lines in political competition. Such a causal direction implies
that ethnic fractionalization should not lead to corruption via politics, which
would therefore contradict a large part of the conclusions by Alessina et al.
A prerequisite for ethnic politicization should be the prevalence of strong
ethnic identities. Earlier works, such as Hobsbawm (2012) have proposed
that ethnic identities are not necessarily static, but rather constructed and
reconstructed by state institutions and politics. Posner (2005) has stud-
ied how the battle for power has led to the political articulation of either
language or tribe, whichever has the most substantial chance of winning
the majority. Laclau and Mouﬀe (2001) have suggested that articulation
within the political discourse is the primary tool in the creation of political
hegemony in which the primary conﬂict lines, the contending groups and
collective identities are deﬁned. Therefore, it is not unlikely that politics
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can have an enhancing eﬀect on ethnic identiﬁcation, a process that could
be particularly potent when state institutions do not function impartially
and when elections become a competition for scarce public goods.
The extent of ethnic voting diﬀers between multi-ethnic countries. Two
countries such as Guinea and Zambia, with similar degrees of ethnic fraction-
alization, have very diﬀerent levels of ethnic voting, according to Afrobarom-
eter data (Bratton, Mattes, & Gyimah-Boadi, 2015). The variance in ethnic
voting between multi-ethnic countries implies that ethnic fractionalization
is not the only important factor in explaining the politicization of ethnicity,
measured as ethnic voting.
There are several possible motivations for why corruption can be a con-
tributing factor to ethnic voting. Orjuela (2014) has proposed that corrup-
tion can exacerbate grievances along ethnic lines, as corruption has just the
property of depending on particularized trust, meaning a positive diﬀerence
between in-group and out-group trust. Corruption should decrease the lev-
els of generalized trust (Rothstein, 2013), which combined with a state that
is unable to enforce contracts between people creates a need for reliance
on other institutions, where ethnic institutions should be a useful choice,
in order to, for example, conduct market transactions (Alesina & Ferrara,
2005).
In summary, there is reason to believe that corruption, rather than ethnic
fractionalization per se, causes ethnic politicization, which also would imply
that ethnic fractionalization should not lead to corruption via politics. The
research question that follows from the stated problem is: what is the causal
direction in the relationship between corruption and ethnic fractionalization,
and how can the causal relationship be theoretically motivated?
This thesis will conduct three analyses with the aim to investigate the
correlation, the causal direction and the individual mechanisms involved in
the relationship between corruption and ethnic voting. The correlation will
be investigated via an OLS regression. The causal direction will be investi-
gated by means of an instrumental variable regression, where an instrument
for corruption will be constructed by measures of press freedom, the involve-
ment of civil society in the political process, uneven economic development
and internet access. The involved individual mechanism will be investigated
by means of a multilevel mixed-eﬀects linear regression. The analyses will
ﬁnd support for the suggested correlation, causal direction and individual
mechanism involved.
The paper proceeds as follows: in section 2, I will summarize the current
research on ethnic voting and the interaction between ethnicity and state
institutions. In section 3, I will propose a theoretical explanation of the
relationship between corruption and ethnic voting. In section 4, I will present
a research strategy to approach the issue at hand. In section 5, I will test
my theory with the help of three analyses based on Afrobarometer data. In
section 6, I will discuss the implications of the results, with a concluding
6
discussion.
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2 | Previous research
Corruption generally has negative consequences for human development, as it
both reduces economic growth and the quality of social services, which means
that corruption is negatively correlated with, for example, life expectancy,
educational attainment, the standard of living and literacy. The absence of
corruption is also a component in Quality of Government, which is positively
correlated with environmental sustainability, economic equality, and other
measures (Holmberg, Rothstein, & Nasiritousi, 2009).
The theorized eﬀects of ethnic fractionalization are for example a higher
degree of corruption and less social services as well (Alesina et al., 2003).
Studies from the USA show that cities that are ethnically fractionalized
prefer lower taxes above public goods provisions (Alesina, Baqir, & Easterly,
1999). Ethnic fractionalization is also negatively correlated with economic
growth, quality of policies, and quality of institutions at a country-level
(Alesina et al., 2003).
If ethnicity is seen as a constant characteristic, it is intuitive that the
direction of causality is that ethnic fractionalization is the root cause of
corruption, given the correlation between the variables . However, Ahlerup
and Olsson (2012) propose that the roots of ethnicities are found in the
competition for resources, which could imply that ethnic structures change
as material factors evolve. Hobsbawm (2012) studies the state's involvement
in the formation of nationalities, showing other examples of how national
identities are reshaped over time. Only half the French people spoke at least
some French at the time of the French revolution, and somewhere between
12-13 percent of the population spoke what could be considered the French
language, but the share increased as institutions such as conscription were
introduced.
Just as state institutions and politics can contribute to the formation
of nationalities and articulation of ethnic favoritism, Hroch (1993) suggests
that, in the absence of functioning state institutions, one will have to rely on
other institutions. Under acute stress, this will make people to "over-value
the protective comfort of their own national group."
Some of the most cited papers that suggest a causal direction in which
ethnic fractionalization per se leads to corruption are Mauro (1998), Easterly
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(1997), La Porta et al. (1999), Alesina et al. (2003), and Posner (2004), which
are papers that lack thorough and explicit theory about the mechanisms of
ethnic fractionalization. Here follows the walkthrough of some papers that
motivate a theory behind why ethnic fractionalization can aﬀect both cor-
ruption and other related institutions, as an orientation to the current state
of theory, and criticism of the strengths and weaknesses of each respective
theory.
Alesina and Ferrara (2005) propose three reasons behind the causal di-
rection between ethnic fractionalization and corruption. The ﬁrst is related
to the aggregation of individual preferences of attributing positive utility to
the well-being of one's group. I.e., people, in general, tend to prefer others
from their ethnicity, which leads to diﬀerences at a systemic level. The sec-
ond explanation is that ethnicity aﬀects the strategies that individuals use
during market transactions. In places with market failures, ethnic aﬃliation
is used as a reputation mechanism, which evens out information asymmetry,
with the side eﬀect of losses attributed to generalizations. Ethnicities will
mainly be necessary when legal contracts cannot be enforced due to weak in-
stitutions, as the stakes of economic cooperation are not as high where there
are means to resolve legal disputes. The third explanation relates to that the
cost of production increases with ethnic diversity as a result of diﬃculties in
communication over lingual or cultural lines.
The logic behind the ﬁrst reason about prioritizing one's group could be
explained by Milgram (1970), who argues that the overload of interactions
between people in modern societies means that one will prioritize social re-
sponsibility to those who share many of the same characteristics as oneself.
Putnam (2007) carries on this idea, theorizing that social distance is a func-
tion of one's social identity, which can be deconstructed and constructed
again. In the absence of other forms of social identities, ethnic categories
could be the primary source for social identities, leading to a higher social
distance between ethnicities rather than between other categories. Using
this logic, Putnam argues that ethnic fractionalization leads to lower levels
of social trust, lower conﬁdence in local government, or lower likelihood of
giving to charities, and he supports hist claims with data from the USA.
The theory does, however, have contradictive empirical ﬁndings, as the
study also shows that levels of trust will decrease within ethnic groups in
ethnically diverse communities (Putnam, 2007). Putnam ﬁnds that ethnic
diversity leads to a lower level of generalized trust, not only between races in
the USA but also within the races of the respondents. Moreover, ethnocen-
tric trust, meaning in-group trust within one's race minus out-group trust
towards other races, is uncorrelated with ethnic fractionalization, which in-
dicates that ethnic fractionalization per se does not lead to higher friction
between ethnic groups, but that it instead leads to generally low levels of
social trust.
Social trust is negatively correlated with corruption, but Rothstein (2013)
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argues for a causality where corruption leads to lower social trust. When
public oﬃcials - people whom the law requires to act in the service of the
public - can not be trusted to follow the law, why would people, in general,
trust others to uphold the social contract? If we assume that corruption
unidirectionally causes a lower degree of social trust rather than the other
way around, then we can overall rule out the causality: ethnic fractionaliza-
tion ⇒ lower social trust ⇒ corruption. It could instead be so that Putnam
has missed a spurious relationship in which corruption both leads to the low
levels of trust and the ethnic fractionalization in the case of the USA.
Uslaner (2013) does propose a form of feedback between trust and cor-
ruption, and this relationship is a central component in his inequality trap,
where inequality ⇒ low social trust ⇒ corruption ⇒ inequality. However,
Uslaner is speciﬁc in that corruption at least requires one form of trust, an
"honor among thieves", i.e., in-group trust. It seems unlikely that ethnic
fractionalization contributes to the inequality trap, as ethnic fractionaliza-
tion is uncorrelated with ethnocentric trust (Putnam, 2007).
Economic inequality per se seems to be a cause of clientelism, as suggested
by Stokes (2011). (Orjuela, 2014) also suggests that ethnic diﬀerences can
provide a moral justiﬁcation for corruption and clientelism and an argument
for ethnic politicization, in the sense that it is our turn to eat.
It should be hard to generalize empirical results on the link between
ethnic fractionalization and other measures from studies in the USA. In the
USA, ethnic fractionalization is not only a measure of fractionalization per se
but also a proxy of the distribution between the white majority population
and the Asian, Black and Hispanic minority populations (as well as other
categories). However, we know that the USA is still a racially hierarchical
country which is manifested in that the median income in Asian households
is 119 percent of the income of white households, while Hispanic households
earn 74 percent and black households earn 59 percent of the income of white
households (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018).
The results of the eﬀect of ethnic fractionalization in the studies of, for
example Alesina et al. (1999), that suggest that ethnic fractionalization leads
to lower public goods provisions, or Putnam (2007), that suggest that ethnic
fractionalization leads to lower social trust, are consistent after controlling
for socioeconomic factors, such as income and education. However, their
studies could still miss an eﬀect in which corruption is an underlying vari-
able, meaning that corruption could lead to both a higher degree of ethnic
fractionalization in the aﬀected regions and a lower extent of social trust. At
least two possible explanations of this spurious relationship are likely in the
case of the USA. If communities that have a higher degree of public goods
provisions to schools and welfare services are attractive to live in, this could
form a selection bias in which Blacks and Hispanics are referred to com-
munities with lower public goods provisions and more corruption. Another
possible explanation is that the same factors that lead to that Blacks and
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Hispanics earn less than Whites and Asians (a possible explanation being
structural racism), will also lead to a lower degree of public goods provisions
and a smaller likelihood of combatting corruption, as the public might not
be as interested in the welfare of the minority groups.
It is also worth to note that diﬀerences that are used as explanations
for corruption in other countries, such as religion, are not studied so thor-
oughly in the case of the USA. The social distance between races in the USA
or even the distance between Catholics and Lutherans in the USA should
theoretically be larger than the distance between clans in Somalia or tribes
in many other African countries if we look upon ethnic practices. However,
while the smaller ethnic diﬀerences are thoroughly studied in the African
case and suggested as an explanation for conﬂict and corruption, they are
largely ignored in the USA.
The second explanation by Alesina and Ferrara (2005), that ethnicities
aﬀect market strategies by aﬀecting the information bias in market transac-
tions, has an interesting element, being that ethnicities play a particularly
important role when the legal power of the state is weak. However, this
implies that state institutions play an essential role in explaining ethnic
conﬂicts, which points to a causal direction from weak state institutions to
corruption.
The third explanation by Alesina and Ferrara (2005), that ethnic dif-
ferences lead to higher transaction costs due to communication problems, is
plausible in cases of diﬀerences in language but loses much of its explanatory
power when applied to other types of diﬀerences, such as race or religion, as
they should technically not aﬀect communication so much.
Glaeser and Saks (2006) but concludes a direction of causality from eth-
nic fractionalization via politics to corruption: "If an area is torn apart by
ethnic divisions and leaders tend to allocate resources towards backers of their
own ethnicity, then members of one ethnic group might continue to support
a leader of their ethnic group, even if he is known to be corrupt.". Their
proposed logic is that when corruption is introduced, to begin with, it will
persist in ethnically fractionalized societies, as voters will not be interested in
removing those in charge of the corrupt situation. They do, however later,
therefore, examine the eﬀect of ethnic heterogeneity overall on corruption
in the USA, using linear regression. However, their theorized reason why
ethnic fractionalization would lead to corruption will at best imply that eth-
nic fractionalization makes corruption worse in already corrupt communities
because of ethnic voting, meaning that a linear model based on the theory
has problems with internal validity. Moreover, they do theorize that ethnic
voting can be a result of corruption or at least clientelism, even though they
do not investigate that causal direction.
Dincer (2008) refers to the anthropologist Van den Berghe (1987) ethny
concept, as a justiﬁcation of in-group favoritism within ethnicities. Berghe
developed a sociologic theory in which social networks of extended family
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and relatives constitute a group which is a target for in-group favoritism.
However, van den Berghe himself suggests that this type of social network
consists of a few hundred members, and would be ﬂawed when applied to
ethnicities that amount to millions of members.
Another exception to the absence of theoretical motivations is Cerqueti,
Coppier, and Piga (2012), who create a model explaining the relationship. In
sum, they propose a principal-agent environment consisting of entrepreneurs,
bureaucrats, and controllers. Entrepreneurs rely on bureaucrats in order to
run their businesses, and the bureaucrats are controlled by the controllers
who can give them ﬁnes if they do not follow the laws. In the model, the
controllers are assumed not to report activity of bureaucrats belonging to the
same ethnicity. Another assumption of the model is that a higher fraction-
alization will increase the monitoring costs due to communications barriers
which should in turn reduce the monitoring level, and thereby increase the
level of corruption. There will therefore exist an optimal monitoring level
for the state, where the monitoring costs and the losses of corruption are
balanced. All actors in the model are assumed to act rationally except the
controllers, that do not maximize utility because of assumed characteristics
of ethnicity. Moreover, the thought of non-corrupt controllers is an excit-
ing assumption as the other type of bureaucrats in the model are assumed
to be as corrupt as possible. However, in this model, the controllers even
have a corrupt function. The principal-agent assumptions in the modeling
of corruption have also been criticized for a mischaracterization of systemic
corruption (Persson, Rothstein, & Teorell, 2013). The internal contradic-
tions among the assumptions, as well as the issue with external validity in
relation to systemic corruption makes the model ﬂawed.
As Dinesen and Sønderskov (2015) conclude, even though the empirical
relationship between ethnic diversity and social trust is widely explored,
the theoretical explanation of the causal direction seldom explored in-depth.
Apart from the three suggestions by Alesina and Ferrara (2005), what other
explanations of the eﬀects of ethnic fractionalization seem credible?
An evolutionary-biological approach has been proposed by several au-
thors before. People will want their genes to survive, which promotes a form
of ethnic altruism, according to (Rushton, 2005). The same ethnic altru-
ism, a genetic need for once genes to reach superiority, can explain ethnic
conﬂicts and even genocides, according to the theory. Vanhanen (2012a)
writes that we can trace the roots of ethnic conﬂict and violence to human
nature, and deﬁnes what he calls ethnic nepotism, which he argues is an
evolutionary drive for favoring one's ethnicity. He backs his argument by
pointing to a signiﬁcant relationship between ethnic fractionalization and
the degree of ethnic interest conﬂicts in a country. However, it should be
evident that at least a small extent of ethnic fractionalization is needed in
order for ethnic interest conﬂicts to be possible at all, and the distance from
this insight to the proposed theory is vast. One criticism of the evolutionary-
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biological approach is Van den Berghe (1987), who argues that in most cases,
when genetic diﬀerences can be observed between people, this is the result of
long-distance migration. Ethnic interest conﬂicts, such as conﬂicts between
tribes, should instead at least historically have occurred in environments in
which is almost impossible to decide ethnicity based on appearance. Another
argument against the evolutionary-biological approach can perhaps be found
in the social constructivist discussion about race and racism, which is too
long to be investigated as a whole, but where many authors conclude that
racial properties are constructed by society rather than derived from human
nature (Smedley & Smedley, 2005). Moreover, Vanhanen (2012a) does not
respond to the many exceptions to ethnic nepotism, meaning all developed
multi-ethnic countries with a deﬁcient degree of ethnic conﬂict.
Vanhanen (2012b) theorizes a reason behind why ethnic conﬂicts do not
always result from ethnic fractionalization, as The authoritarian communist
regime in multiethnic Yugoslavia had been strong enough to prevent erup-
tions of ethnic violence." Historical examples, such as the Saddam Hussein
regime in Iraq point towards that authoritarianism can even be combined
with genocide.
Posner (2005) constructs the issue of ethnic voting in a public choice
framework, where the political actors structure the rules of political compe-
tition so that citizens embrace the most advantageous social identity. When
the institutional frameworks, such as the electoral system, changes, the po-
litical conﬂict lines have shifted in Zambia from tribe to language and back
to tribe. Posner also argues that ethnicity is currently salient in Zambian
politics "precisely because of the widespread expectation that people in po-
sitions of power will favor members of their ethnic groups", which implies
that ethnic voting will follow from the expectation of clientelism. As a con-
sequence of his proposed relationship between ethnic voting and clientelism,
if the possibility of clientelism is removed, the incentives of ethnic voting
should be decreased.
Another option remains: that corruption both leads to both a higher
degree of ethnic fractionalization and lower to social trust. This relationship
is, of course, impossible if we regard ethnicities as static or even almost
static. Some evidence suggest that ethnicity might well change over time,
such as Ahlerup and Olsson (2012), who propose that the roots of ethnic
diversity can be found in the competition for public goods. Modern state
experience, i.e., mechanisms for the distribution of public goods will have a
reducing eﬀect on ethnic diversity.
Contemporary national self-identiﬁcation can also change over time. In,
for example, Montenegro, the share that identiﬁes as Montenegrins have
fallen from 91 percent in the 1948 census to 45 percent in the 2011 census,
and the share that identiﬁes as Yugoslavs had fallen from 5 percent in 1981
to 0 percent in 2011 (Montstat, 2011). The identiﬁcation in Taiwan points to
similar results, where the share of people who consider themselves Chinese
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instead of Taiwanese have been falling over time (Chen, 2017). The general
trends in the world are not as drastic, and states will probably not reshape
ethnic or national identities in any dramatic ways. More interesting than
studying ethnic fractionalization per se is perhaps to study the politicization
of ethnic identity. Easterly (2001) points towards how ethnic conﬂict can be
seen as a function of both ethnic diversity and institutional strength, where
institutional strength will have an absorbing eﬀect on ethnic conﬂict. Vio-
lent ethnic conﬂict is perhaps the ultimate politicization of ethnic identity.
However, this politicization also occurs in peaceful democracies in the shape
of ethnic voting.
In summary, the literature that has been reviewed is characterized by a
lack of theory behind why ethnic fractionalization should lead to corruption.
It is not evident in the previous research why individuals should prefer others
from their own ethnicity and why this preference must be aggregated and
politicized. Many studies suggest a correlation between ethnic fractionaliza-
tion and lower levels of social trust. However, the lower levels of trust apply
both in-group and out-group, which makes an increase in corruption along
ethnic lines implausible via that mechanism. We have also studied studies in
favour for that corruption lead to both low levels of trust and inequality, and
studies that conclude that inequality is a good base for clientelist practices.
These theories will be part of the underpinning of the theoretic framework
in this thesis, as explained in the next chapter.
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3 | Theory
I will begin by targeting three assumptions behind the idea that ethnic frac-
tionalization leads to corruption.
The ﬁrst assumption is that ethnicities are something pre-determined,
like an artefact from the Tower of Babel or a static property given by nature.
This means that ethnicities are somewhat independent of state institutions.
The historical roots of contemporary nationalities are however, often pre-
ceded by the formation of state institutions, as Hobsbawm (2012) argues.
Hroch (1993) also explains the rise of nationalism after the breakdown of
Communist rule, with that familiar ties crumble, leading to a general anxi-
ety and insecurity in which the national idea takes over the role of collective
integration In conditions of acute stress, people characteristically tend to
over-value the protective comfort of their own national group. In summary,
states seem to create new national identities, and the absence of states can
lead to that old identities take over the role of upholding security from the
states.
If we continue this thought, corruption is a form of antithesis to state
power, as states rely on the maintenance of rules through force. Corruption
is then only possible when rules cannot be enforced properly. Therefore, I
hypothesize that strong state power, such as Hobsbawm (2012) described
for example France after the revolution, will construct new ethnic identities.
Meanwhile, ethnic fractionalization and ethnic conﬂict should be a result of
a long-term lack of state capacity. Moreover, in the absence of present-day
state capacity, the ancient institutions  ethnicities  take its place.
The second assumption is that people will favor co-ethnics over members
of other ethnic communities. However, is it as relevant in modern societies,
and in that case, how would it manifest? We can imagine a society where all
forms of state institutions and judiciary treat people completely impartial,
and where the economic institutions are non-extractive and promote fair
competition. In such a society, ethnic favoritism would both be absent in
the public sector and a non-competitive behavior in market competition.
Therefore, there would be no room to treat ethnicities diﬀerent in a way that
would impact their workplace situation, economic status or their rights before
the law. There would be no reason for ethnic politicization in those areas.
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The distribution of capital between ethnicities could still be an argument for
ethnic politicization in this hypothetical society, but an as broad political
appeal as possible, reaching across ethnic borders, should be the preferred
strategy for electoral victories, which should be an argument for the party
as a rational actor to treat the distribution of capital as a non-ethnic issue.
One possible explanation to why people prefer people from their own eth-
nicity, that has been mentioned in the previous research, is genetic or ethnic
altruism, meaning an evolutionary-biology rational explanation to ethnic fa-
voritism. However, genetic diversity seems to have a positive impact on the
population's possibility to adapt to changing environments, meaning that
genetic altruism should not be evolutionarily favorable (Lankau & Strauss,
2007). Countless other arguments could be made for why people will favor
co-ethnics, such as the issue of ethnicity as a cultural trait, which could be
approached form a social-constructivist perspective. In conclusion, the the-
sis put forward here is just that the idea of ethnic favoritism should not be
considered an absolute truth.
The third assumption is that ethnic favoritism in politics is a result of
processes related to non-material interest. Here, I would instead suggest
rather that the explanation for ethnic voting relates to the competition with
other ethnicities for public goods. The aggregation of materialist interest
into ethnic favoritism can have both an instrumental and a structural expla-
nation. In the structural variant, the public choice school comes to hand,
in which voters are considered both rational and policy-oriented (Dewan &
Shepsle, 2011), and will consequently vote for whatever option that gains
them the most, which should in most cases be ethnic favoritism in the short
term.
In my theory, I would instead suggest the following explanation. I will
disregard a too literal interpretation the theories of the primitive accumu-
lation by Marx (1867) or in the Olson (1993) theory of the roving bandit,
in which the roots of the state can be found in an anarchy of power diﬀer-
ences, where the actor with the highest violence potential will be able to
rule over others. I instead choose a more Hobbesian approach, as in that
people prefer the absence of violence and theft, and that the materialist
explanations should instead refer to that the capital owner or bandit that
succeeds in creating a system of order will also achieve legitimacy from the
people under their rule. Such a rule must be able to resolve conﬂicts over,
for example property in order to prevent violence. In the most primitive
community, these types of conﬂicts would typically be resolved by the head
of the family, or whoever has the most considerable legitimacy, for example
via the classic sit-down between gangsters in The Sopranos, where Tony
Soprano has autocratic power over how to resolve conﬂicts within his branch
of the Maﬁa. In larger societies, such as the ethny, conﬂicts would need to
be resolved in tribal councils, by elders, by religious leaders, or by the one
with the most massive capital of violence. However, when we reach above
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the ethny, conﬂicts will need to be resolved through state institutions.
When state institutions fail to function, one will have to rely on more
primitive institutions in order to achieve security and absence of violence
and theft, as suggested by Hroch (1993). In failed states, ethnic institutions
might provide order, but only in-group, as the power of an ethnic or religious
leader will not apply to people of other ethnicities. The limits of ethnic
institutions will create distrust towards other groups. If we also assume
that countries with a higher degree of corruption will have scarce welfare
provisions and public goods, and the competition for the existing goods
could lead to ethnic voting.
In countries with impartial governments, the importance of ethnicity in
politics should be low, as the impact of elections in most cases will not
aﬀect the direct output of government. In countries with a high degree of
corruption and clientelism, the dominant ethnicity of the party in government
should play a much more signiﬁcant role, as they can provide more goods
towards people of their ethnicity.
Parties that are partial towards a particular ethnicity will act according
to an ethnicity-based form of clientelism, as in the proﬀering of material
goods in return for electoral support where the criterion of distribution that
the patron uses is: did you (will you) support me? (Stokes, 2011). However,
there is little need for an explicit exchange of material goods in connection
to elections, as there will be an implicit expectation from the voters that the
ethnic party will work to favor them.
Stokes (2011) also suggests that economic inequality per se seems to be a
cause of clientelism. If we assume rational actors, the interests of the ruling
elites to employ clientelism should be independent of ethnic demographics,
but one could expect a harder case of moral justiﬁcation of clientelism in eth-
nic homogenous contexts. Add to the equation that ethnic diﬀerences can
provide a moral justiﬁcation for corruption, an argument for ethnic politi-
cization, in the sense that it is our turn to eat (Orjuela, 2014).
Countries with a high degree of corruption will also have a large gap
between party policies and the actual implementation of the policies, which
leads to that political parties will have little credibility on actual policy
matters. As a result, voters will prefer parties with a history of patronage
transactions, over parties that aim to provide public goods via universalistic
policies, as they oﬀer a greater assurance of beneﬁt (Chandra, 2007).
Another important diﬀerence from classic clientelism and a contributing
factor behind why corruption could lead to ethnic voting is the fear of being
disfavored by other ethnic groups, in case the other ethnic groups take over
the government. The fear of repression from other ethnic groups could lead to
that also rational voters that do not notably support an ethnic-nationalist
cause might vote for ethnic parties, as they otherwise would risk losing a
favorable treatment to other ethnic groups.
One further argument for that ethnicity are a good target for particu-
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Corruption Lower state capacity
Revert to ethnic institutions Asymmetry between in-group and out-group trust
Ethnic politicization
Figure 3.1: Visual representation of the proposed causal model.
laristic policies is that ethnicity is usually more static than, for example,
class or the target for agrarian issues. People can change class over their
lifetime or move from rural to urban areas, and many class-based parties
in functioning democracies strive to reshape their electoral base by the help
of universalistic policies. Meanwhile, ethnic parties work to preserve eth-
nic diﬀerences. Therefore, ethnicity could be a more natural category to
accentuate politically.
To summarize my theory, I propose that state power will provide means
of security from violence and in the long run, even reconstruct ethnicity along
state borders. I also propose that the absence of state power, as manifested
by the extent of corruption, will force people to rely on more primitive insti-
tutions in order to resolve conﬂicts  and in multi-ethnic countries, this will
typically be ethnic institutions. As ethnic institutions can only resolve con-
ﬂicts within one's own ethnicity, the need for them will create an asymmetry
between in-group and out-group trust. If articulated, this asymmetry will be
a good basis for clientelist approaches by political entrepreneurs, meaning
that ethnicity is politicized as a base for ethnic identity politics. Thus, cor-
ruption leads to ethnic voting. Figure 3.1 is a representation of the proposed
causal relations.
Following from the theory, I propose the following hypothesis:
H1: The extent of corruption in a country leads to ethnic voting
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4 | Research strategy
4.1 Design
This quantitative study will be conducted in three steps. First, I will use OLS
regression to investigate whether a correlation exists between corruption and
the politicization of ethnicity, measured as the extent of ethnic voting. This
evaluation is a necessary test of the hypothesis, as a correlation indicates a
relationship and a dependence between variables, direct or indirect.
A correlation does however not imply causation. An establishment of
that correlation is, not proof per se for either the suggested hypothesis or
theory. Does corruption lead to ethnic voting, as the hypothesis suggests, or
is the causal direction reversed? Or have we observed a spurious relationship
where ethnic fractionalization both leads to corruption and ethnic voting?
To address this issue, I use an instrumental variable approach in order to
isolate the unidirectional eﬀects of corruption on ethnic voting. The method
will work in two stages, where the purpose of the ﬁrst stage is to use vari-
ables unrelated to ethnic voting and ethnic fractionalization to predict the
level of corruption in the country. Next, the instrument is used instead of
corruption in a regression, together with the other variables. The purpose
of the instrumental variable analysis is to establish the causal direction be-
tween corruption and ethnic voting. By constructing a study that excludes
the possible eﬀects of ethnic fractionalization or omitted variables on ethnic
voting, we can study the eﬀect of corruption per se, and draw more accu-
rate conclusions regarding the mechanisms of the relationship, including the
direction of causality.
Last, I will study the relationship on an individual level, to bring insight
to my proposed mechanisms, by studying how an individual's perception
of corruption aﬀects its extent of ethnic voting. In the theory section, I
suggested a mechanism in which an individual's perception of corruption
aﬀects its probability of voting for an ethnic party. Therefore, diﬀerent
results on the individual and aggregated level will mean that the proposed
theory is inconclusive.
Anyone of the analyses will not be as meaningful alone, as the three
analyses rely on each other to test the theory. A correlation between ethnic
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fractionalization and ethnic voting does not stand in conﬂict with reverse
causality. The use of an instrumental variable indicates a causal direction
but does not tell us much about the proposed theoretical mechanisms. The
study on the individual level could also be consistent with various possi-
ble spurious relationships between corruption and ethnic voting. All three
analyses combined will however tell a more credible story of the involved
mechanisms.
4.2 Data
The primary sources of data in this study are the Afrobarometer and the
Quality of Government dataset (Bratton et al., 2015; Teorell et al., 2019).
The Afrobarometer rounds span over the years 2005, 2008, 2013 and 2016.
A summary of the sources of the variables can be found in Appendix A.1.
4.3 Case selection/scope
The study will be conducted by a statistical evaluation of 31 African coun-
tries. Several reasons motivate the use of ethnic voting in Africa. To begin
with, the variance is greater, both in terms of ethnic fractionalization and
corruption, as compared with for example many European states. Second,
the data from the Afrobarometer include better measures of ethnicity, but
also the perception of corruption, as compared with other large surveys such
as the European Values Survey, World Values Survey, Lapop, and other
similar sources.
It should be noted that the scope of this study is ethnic politicization in
electoral democracies, via the study of ethnic voting. The study of ethnic
politicization in countries without electoral democracy would require other
methods.
This thesis will include two levels of analysis. Two studies will aggregate
individual data to conduct country-level comparisons between the countries,
while one study will be conducted on an individual level.
The after sought case should be a pathway case according to the deﬁnition
by Gerring (2007), which means a case in which more than one path can
lead to a particular outcome. In this case, either ethnic fractionalization or
corruption can be seen as paths to ethnic voting, and we will want to take
ethnic fractionalization into account when we study the eﬀect of corruption.
The spread of ethnic voting, corruption, and ethnic fractionalization is
large in the population. Botswana, with a Bayesian Corruption Indicator
score of 37, has a lower perception of corruption than for example South
Korea and a comparable level with many EU countries, such as Poland,
Lithuania, Cyprus, and Malta. Guinea with a score of 69, ranks higher than
countries such as Syria, Congo, and Iraq. The dataset also includes countries
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such as Uganda, where the largest ethnic group makes up only 16.5 percent
of the population, with another eight ethnic groups in the span 3-10 percent.
However, the dataset also includes Lesotho, where the only ethnic diﬀerences
are within the Sotho subgroup, that make up 99,7 percent of the population.
Posner (2005) suggests that his ﬁndings regarding ethnic voting in Zam-
bia should be possible to generalize to environments such as Los Angeles as
well. I have criticized that results from the USA are generalizable already
in section 2. Many of the countries included in this study have a very high
degree of ethnic fractionalization, as compared with, for example, European
countries. It is therefore plausible that there exists, for example, a threshold
needed for ethnic voting to occur at all. The large variance in the observed
variables does, however, indicate a high degree of generalizability, at least
within the spectrum we have in the data.
4.4 Ethnicity, ethnic voting, fractionalization and
polarization
The deﬁnition of ethnicity that is used throughout this thesis is the one by
Horowitz (1985), that "Ethnicity is based on a myth of collective ancestry,
which usually carries with it traits believed to be innate. Some notion of
ascription, however diluted, and aﬃnity deriving from it are inseparable from
the concept of ethnicity", as his deﬁnition both condenses many of the most
used deﬁnition prior to his, and that his work has become one of the most
cited since.
The deﬁnition of an ethnic party is not at all evident. Parties with
ethnic manifestos could hypothetically either pursuit non-ethnic issues or
attract voters from other ethnic groups. Parties without ethnic manifestos
can pursuit policy positions that are favorable to one ethnicity.
Chandra (2007) deﬁnes an ethnic party as a party that represents itself to
voters as the champion of the interests of one ethnic category or set of cate-
gories to the exclusion of another or others, and makes such a representation
central to its strategy of mobilizing voters..
Chandra (2011) proposes four diﬀerent classiﬁcations of ethnic parties:
1. A classiﬁcation based on the name.
2. A classiﬁcation based on the political platform.
3. A classiﬁcation based on how a majority of an ethnic group votes.
4. A classiﬁcation based on which ethnic group a majority of the voters
for a party belongs to.
Using explicit deﬁnitions, such as name or political platform, will avoid
false positives but might produce false negatives. Using statistics of voters,
ethnicities will avoid false negatives but might produce false positives.
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The country-level studies in this thesis will employ a mix between Chan-
dra's classiﬁcation 3 and 4 and will be derived by processing ethnicities and
party choices from the Afrobarometer for each included country. The ethnic
voting score is derived by interacting the probability that two people who
vote for the same party also belong to the same ethnic group with the proba-
bility that two people who belong to the same ethnic group also vote for the
same ethnic party. It is, therefore, a mix between classiﬁcation 3 and 4, as
proposed by (Chandra, 2011). The motivation for this measure is to begin
with a practical issue of the diﬃculty in deciding both the "de jure"-content
of party manifestos from the entire continent, but also to decide the "de
facto"-popularity in ethnic groups. A continuous variable for the degree of
ethnic voting for a party also has the advantage of bringing more possible nu-
ance to the measure than a simple dummy variable approach. The formula is:
(
∑ethnicgroups
i=1 pi
∑parties
j=1 qij ) · (
∑parties
i=1 ri
∑ethnicgroups
j=1 sij )
where pi stands for a fraction of ethnic group i to the entire population,
qij stands for the size of party j in ethnic group i. ri stands for a fraction of
party r to the entire population, while sij means the size of ethnic group j in
party i. This model was initially proposed in a master's thesis by El Koubi
(2016), who also includes a more detailed description of how the measure is
calculated. I have however calculated the degree of ethnic voting in round
3-6 of Afrobarometer as well, instead of just round 5.
Alesina et al. (2003) suggest that ethnic fractionalization can be measured
as the probability that two random people in a population will belong to
diﬀerent ethnic groups. I.e., 1 − ∑ethnicgroupsi=1 p2i , where pi stands for a
fraction of the group i to the entire population.
An alternative measure of the distribution of ethnicities in a popula-
tion can be measured through the ethnic polarization index, as proposed
by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). It measures how close a distribu-
tion is to an entirely bipolar set (12 , 0, ..., 0,
1
2). The formula looks as follows:
4
∑ethnicgroups
i=1 ·p2i (1−pi), where pi stands for a fraction of the ethnic group to
the entire population. The ethnic polarization index has a stronger explana-
tory power than ethnic fractionalization for conﬂicts in a country (Montalvo
& Reynal-Querol, 2005). Both measures combined provide more informa-
tion about the distribution of ethnic groups in a country than each measure
alone.
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5 | Analyses
5.1 Country-level correlation between corruption and
ethnic voting
The ﬁrst analysis will study the correlation between corruption and ethnic
voting, by the use of regression analysis on a panel dataset consisting of
the included countries and years in the Afrobarometer dataset. Normally, a
random-eﬀects or linear-eﬀects population-averaged would probably be ap-
plied for a short, unbalanced dataset such as this. However, ethnic fraction-
alization and ethnic polarization are constant over the period in the dataset,
meaning that the variables will be omitted in a linear ﬁxed-eﬀects model,
where the internal change in each country is measured, which is also one
of the two components in a random-eﬀects model. I will, therefore, study
the between-eﬀects exclusively, meaning the study of the diﬀerence between
countries. The time-component will, therefore, be averaged out, and the
just the country cases will be compared in the regression. An advantage of
the use of ethnic fractionalization and ethnic polarization as constant over
the time period is that changes in the ethnic demographics with an almost
constant population could be correlated with ethnic politicization, such as
in the cases with Montenegro or Taiwan, as described in section 2. A dis-
advantage is that the model will not capture the eﬀects of migration on the
ethnic composition in countries, which will have some eﬀect if there are eth-
nic diﬀerences within countries in regard to emigration, or when the levels
of immigration are high.
GDP per capita is used as a control variable, as the level of economic
development is likely to aﬀect voting behaviour. We use the size of the
population as control variables, as it is correlated with the perception of
corruption, although the causality is debated (Knack & Azfar, 2003). The
level of democracy is used to control for that autocratic regimes could either
promote or prevent ethnic politicization. Years of democracy is used as new
democracies lack the party system stability of older democracies, which could
aﬀect the outcome in both direction. The level of education is used both as
a proxy for human development and because it is not implausible that the
level of education can promote tolerance. The age distribution in a country
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is used as it is a measure of
GDP per capita, population, age distribution, education level, and years
of democracy have been log-transformed, because of skewness of the distri-
bution.
5.1.1 Results
The only signiﬁcant relationship found in table 5.1 is that of corruption,
either when ethnic polarization or both ethnic fractionalization and ethnic
polarization are used as independent variables. In ﬁgure 5.1, we can see the
eﬀect of when we add corruption to the regression. The almost empty second
quadrant and the populated third quadrant indicate that it is uncommon
with a low extent of corruption and a great extent of ethnic voting when
controlled for the other variables included in the regression.
The results imply that my hypothesis that ethnic voting can be explained
by the extent of corruption in a country has so far not been refuted. However,
we have so far just established a correlation between corruption and ethnic
voting. A correlation cannot be used as deﬁnite proof for the hypothesis that
corruption leads to ethnic voting.
An alternative hypothesis, that ethnic fractionalization causes ethnic vot-
ing, which causes corruption, or that ethnic fractionalization causes both
ethnic voting and corruption, can still be valid based on the information
from this ﬁrst analysis. To bring more clarity into which of the available
alternatives seems most plausible, I will conduct another study, where the
possible eﬀects of ethnic fractionalization will be excluded. If the results
are still consistent, they will form proof against the alternative hypotheses
involving that ethnic fractionalization causes corruption via ethnic voting,
or that ethnic fractionalization both causes corruption and ethnic voting.
Some caution can be applied in the interpretation of the results. Model
1-3 indicate an elevated level of multicollinearity, as seen in A.3.1, as a result
of including both the level of democracy and the years of democracy in the
model. The statistical signiﬁcance however persists after the removal of years
of democracy, as seen in model 4.
A test of heteroskedasticity in Appendix A.3.2 indicates a positive result.
When we take heteroskedasticity into account in the calculation of standard
errors, we will still have a signiﬁcant outcome for corruption in model 3 and
4, but not in model 2. Depending on the threshold for removal of inﬂuential
observations, the correlation between corruption and ethnic voting can either
become insigniﬁcant at the p<0.05 level, or signiﬁcant at the p<0.001 level,
as we can see in Appendix A.4.1. A larger sample would probably have
provided more stable results.
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Table 5.1: Regression with ethnic voting as dependent variable
Ethnic voting 1 2 3 4
Corruption .0076363 .0094999* .0098654* .0097033*
(0-100)
Ethnic Fractionalization -.2090225 -.1826156 -.1755893
(0-1)
Ethnic Polarization .2528366 .2261576 .2185054
(0-1)
GDP/cap (log) -.0077236 -.0331359 -.0182986 -.0237249
Population (log) -.0096163 -.00308 .0031011 .0011554
Democracy .0071424 .0150641 .0175063 .0117114
(-10 - 10)
Population aged <14 (log) -.2243099 -.336123 -.2671908 -.2584668
Education level (log) -.0869075 -.0344004 -.0652779 -.0237249
Years of democracy (log) .0074728 -.0124397 -.0207352
R-squared 0.2647 0.3574 0.4054 0.4008
Adj. R-squared -0.0027 0.1004 0.1238 0.1611
No. Observations 94 87 87 87
No. Groups 31 29 29 29
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
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Figure 5.1: Added variable plot for corruption
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coef = .00986539, se = .00371649, t = 2.65
This added variable plot explains the eﬀect of adding corruption to the
regression model
5.2 Instrument variable regression on country-level
The ﬁrst analysis indicated a correlation between corruption and ethnic vot-
ing. However, the correlation cannot yet tell much about the direction of
causality between the two variables, with the used regression model. The
ﬁrst analysis could still be consistent with a causal direction going from eth-
nic fractionalization to corruption. We need a more sophisticated method to
approach clarity about the causal direction. An experimental study would
be ideal to come closer to the answer of the direction of causality. However,
an experiment involving the random assignment of ethnicities and circum-
stances of corruption to the participants does not seem feasible.
A more accessible model is an instrumental variable approach, in which
the eﬀects of corruption on ethnic voting are isolated from the possible eﬀects
of ethnic voting or omitted variables related to ethnic voting on corruption.
This is done by replacing corruption in the model with a measure that is
correlated with corruption without being correlated with ethnic fractional-
ization or the error term. If we ﬁnd that the instrumental variable is corre-
lated with ethnic voting as well, we will have an indication of that the causes
of corruption that should be uncorrelated with ethnic fractionalization will
also lead to more ethnic voting. If the instrumental variable is uncorrelated
with the error term, it is also an indication against an omitted variable bias.
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We have hypothesized corruption as an exogenous variable, meaning that it
is not dependent of ethnic voting, but much of the previous literature has
suggested that corruption is, in fact, endogenous to ethnic voting or ethnic
fractionalization.
The second study recycles the variables from the ﬁrst study, but this time,
corruption is replaced with an instrumental variable created to minimize the
possibility of measuring a spurious relationship between corruption, ethnic
fractionalization and ethnic voting.
In the ﬁrst stage of the instrumental variable regression, the components
that will constitute the instrumental variable are used in a linear regression
to establish a linear model in which the new components will estimate cor-
ruption. I use press freedom, the existence of civil society interest groups,
internet access, and a measure of uneven economic development to construct
the instrument for corruption. After that, the new instrument is used instead
of corruption in the second stage of the regression.
An essential general issue with all these components is that the model
assumes that the instrumental variable is unrelated to unmeasured causes
of the dependent variable (Sovey & Green, 2011). In this case, it is in
particular essential to make sure that the instrument is not aﬀected by the
degree of ethnic fractionalization. Therefore, the assumption that ethnic
fractionalization leads to corruption means that an instrument that is caused
by corruption could be aﬀected by the existence of ethnic fractionalization. I
will therefore speciﬁcally look for instruments that cause corruption, and that
are neither correlated with ethnic fractionalization nor with ethnic voting.
Press freedom is used as I theorize that a free press has better precon-
ditions of detecting corruption and demand responsibility. Similarly, civil
society interest groups will help to hold the political class accountable. In-
ternet access has a similar purpose by facilitating communication and pro-
viding means to organize political demands. Uneven economic development
is chosen as it is a documented source of corruption (Uslaner, 2009).
In A.6, there is a thorough checklist of the properties of the instrumental
variables, as suggested by Sovey and Green (2011). In sum, the analysis
of the instrument points towards that it is appropriate for the use in this
study. The exclusion criteria, meaning that there should be no risk of that
the components of the instrumental variable aﬀect the dependent variable
other than through the instrumental variable, is likely met. This is con-
ﬁrmed by a value of the F-test above the rule-of-thumb of 10, meaning that
the instrument is not likely to be correlated with the error terms, so the
theoretical motivations of the construction of instrument are not refuted.
5.2.1 Results
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In table 5.2, we ﬁnd that the instrumental variable regression still pro-
vides a signiﬁcant relationship between corruption and ethnic voting. The
numerical criteria, such as the F-test, and Hanson's J statistic, are also con-
sistent with a strong and relevant instrument. The instrument is commented
more thoroughly in appendix A.6.
The results in 5.2 are not corrected for heteroskedasticity, which should
still be a problem. In A.4.2, we can ﬁnd a heteroskedasticity-robust instru-
mental variable regression, however with a somewhat changed instrument we
achieve an appropriate F-value.
The results point towards a refusal of the alternative hypothesis, that
ethnic fractionalization causes corruption via ethnic voting, as the causal
mechanism is most likely that corruption causes ethnic voting.
The results are also still consistent with the proposed theory and con-
ﬁrm the proposed causal direction as stated in the hypothesis. However, a
considerable part of both my theory and the research question is devoted
to the idea of an individual mechanism is involved in the causal relation-
ship between corruption and ethnic voting. If we assume that the opposite
is true, that corruption will not cause ethnic voting on an individual level,
then the results from the ﬁrst and second study could either mean that there
is either still an omitted variable that has still not been detected by means
of the instrument or that the theory suggested in section 3 is ﬂawed. To
exclude such alternative hypotheses, we will need to study the individual
mechanisms involved in ethnic voting.
5.3 Individual perception of corruption and ethnic
voting
The third part of the study will focus on the individual mechanisms of ethnic
voting, by investigating whether individuals who perceive a high degree of
corruption in society will also vote for ethnic parties to a greater extent.
This analysis uses the Afrobarometer round 6, and contains 21711 re-
spondents that identify with parties and have stated ethnicity (Bratton et
al., 2015). The dependent variable, the ethnic fractionalization of each party
in the survey has been calculated with the help of that the survey collects
data on the respondent's ethnicity. If we know the relative size of every
ethnic group among the voters for a party, we can also calculate the ethnic
fractionalization of the voters for the party.
The independent variable, a corruption index, has been calculated by
combining answers to questions regarding the perception of corruption in
various institutions. This will be the independent variable. We will also
control for political attitudes by introducing an index regarding the attitude
to tax-funded services, that has been created in the same manner, as well
as an index regarding how authoritarian the respondent is. The country-
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Table 5.3: Multilevel, mixed-eﬀects linear regression of with ethnic fraction-
alization in the party of choice as dependent variable
Fixed
Corruption perception -.0400408***
(0-1)
More state -.0015645
(0-1)
More authoritarian .0146001***
(0-1)
Random
Democracy 2.80e-14
SE: 0.000
Country level corruption 3.22e-12
SE: 0.000
GDP/cap 1.10e-22
SE: 0.000
Level 1 cons .7403115
SE: .0234146
Level 2 cons .0161623
SE: 0.000
Log-likelihood 15759.834
Number of obs 21,711
Number of groups 30
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
level control variables have been retrieved from the Quality of Government
dataset (Teorell et al., 2019).
A full description of the variables can be found in Appendix A.1.
A multilevel, mixed-eﬀects linear regression will be applied, to answer
how much the change in perception of corruption will aﬀect the level of
ethnic fractionalization in the party of choice.
5.3.1 Results
The results in table 5.3 show a signiﬁcant decrease in multi-ethnicity in the
party choice if a voter perceives a high degree of corruption, i.e., that voters
who perceive more corruption are more prone to ethnic voting. As eth-
nic fractionalization is a somewhat complicated measure, to begin with, as
explained in chapter 3, the precise eﬀect of the decrease in ethnic fractional-
ization will depend on how large the fractionalization is, to begin with, and
the ethnic polarization.
It is worth noting that the eﬀect is not of an enormous magnitude. A
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move over the entire spectrum of perception of corruption leads just to a .04
decrease in the fractionalization of the political party of one's choice. The
eﬀect is nonetheless signiﬁcant at a p<0.001 level.
5.4 Summary
In summary, the results from the ﬁrst analysis suggest that there is a sig-
niﬁcant correlation between corruption and ethnic voting. The results from
the second analysis suggest that the direction of causality goes from corrup-
tion to ethnic voting and that the relationship is most likely not aﬀected by
a systematic relation between the independent variable and the dependent
variable, i.e., probably not aﬀected by ethnic demographics. The results
from the third study suggest the existence of an individual mechanism in
which voters who perceive more corruption will also vote for more ethnically
homogenous parties, i.e., vote in accordance with ethnic lines.
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6 | Concluding discussion
The ﬁndings from the three analyses support the hypothesis that corruption
leads to ethnic voting. Moreover, my theoretic suggestion that ethnic voting
on a country-level is aggregated from the individual perception of corruption
is also supported.
If we combine the ﬁndings from all three studies, we can concretize the
ﬁndings by two hypothetical examples of a voter in a country with a majority
and minority population: The ﬁrst country has a problem with corruption.
There are at least two parties, of which one promises to align the corruption
in the voter's ethnic interest, while the other party promises to align the cor-
ruption in another ethnic groups interest. The election, becomes a clientelist
competition in which the party with the largest electorate wins. If the voter
belongs to a minority group that has yet been disfavored by corruption, he
or she will vote for the party that promises that "it is our turn to eat." If the
voter is favored by the existence of corruption, he or she will want to defend
their position. The result is in any case that the voter will choose an ethnic
party. The second country has no problem with corruption. Two new parties
emerge in which one promises to be corrupt in the voter's ethnic interest,
and one party promises to be corrupt in the interest of the other ethnic
group. The voter knows that the institutions in the country will prevent the
possibility of a corrupt outcome, which would make the clientelist promises
along ethnic lines hard, to begin with. Besides, the absence of corruption
will increase the social trust between groups, meaning that there is no reason
to believe that the voters belonging to the other ethnic group will vote in
only their own interest, especially if it is believed that the overall outcome
of an increased ethnic competition for public goods will be harmful overall.
As a result, there are few reasons for the voter to cast his or her vote on an
ethnic party.
The results should be possible to generalize, with some caution. The
study has not measured explicitly, for example, the hierarchy of ethnicity in
countries. So if we would go from an inter-country to an intra-country com-
parison, it is important to take into account that minority ethnicities could
have a lower place in the ethnic hierarchy, and that ethnic fractionalization
does therefore not always just measure fractionalization per se. One should
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want to control for the variables that contribute to the ethnic hierarchy in
the ﬁrst place, i.e., to closer investigate, for example, structural racism.
However, the diversity in both corruption and ethnic fractionalization
should contribute to its generalizability. Except for countries such as China,
Korea, and Japan, it is extremely rare with historic states that are composed
of a population that is almost entirely homogenous (Hobsbawm, 2012). Large
parts of Europe could also be considered an extreme case, with similar levels
of corruption and a low extent of ethnic fractionalization.
Another implication of the results is that the ethnic fractionalization
might not have a great eﬀect on the existence of clientelist practices in elec-
tions, but rather on how clientelism is conducted. In multi-ethnic coun-
tries, ethnic divisions could be a more practical choice to arrange clientelism
around than, for example, class divisions or urban-rural divisions, as ethnic
divisions are more stable in times of economic development and urbanization.
The ﬁndings from the third individual study are apparent and signiﬁcant,
although the eﬀect size is hard to conceptualize. There could also exist a
possible eﬀect that is unmeasured, as people belonging to the ethnicity that
beneﬁts from ethnic politicization and clientelism might perhaps not perceive
the system as corrupt as long as he or she is on the winning side.
The suggested theory is not the most parsimonious, as it implies a some-
what more complicated causal relationship than previous thought.
The suggested theory in section 3 is references elements from many pre-
vious theories: the inequality trap, the causal direction between corruption
and trust, the causal direction between inequality and clientelism and the
causal direction between state capacity and the forming of ethnicities. How-
ever, my theory has the advantage that if one of the underlying theories are
proven wrong, the model will still be somewhat robust. The relationship
between perception of corruption and ethnic voting is supported empirically,
with my somewhat independent theoretical framework of the explanation of
why perceived corruption leads to ethnic voting. Even though my theory is
related to the other suggested causal mechanisms, my results do in no way
build on the assumption that they must all be true.
My contribution with this study is theoretic and empirical support for
that corruption leads to ethnic voting. As a consequence, this means that
ethnic fractionalization should not lead to corruption by means of politics.
Ethnic fractionalization could still, hypothetically, lead to corruption via
for example conﬂicts in the bureaucracy or inter-cultural communication
diﬀerences, but it seems unlikely that we observe such a relationship on a
systemic level without being manifested by ethnic favoritism in politics. In
this sense, my theory achieves a higher degree of parsimony than the theory
that ethnic fractionalization leads to corruption.
One of the major ﬂaws of the previous research on the relationship be-
tween ethnic fractionalization and both corruption and trust is that it is in
many cases, not motivated by theory. This study ﬁlls that gap, by suggesting
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a theory, with empirical results that are not only consistent with the theory,
but that also indicates that the mechanisms as proposed in the theory are
consistent with the results.
The implications of this study cast new light on the causal direction in-
volved in the correlation between ethnic fractionalization and all proposed
measures that are also correlated with the extent of corruption, such as
trust, welfare provisions or economic development. Perhaps corruption per
se is a better explanation than ethnic fractionalization when it comes to
for example variances in levels of trust. The ﬁndings in this thesis could
make it meaningful to revisit many of the ﬁndings of proposed eﬀects of eth-
nic fractionalization, especially when corruption is a contending explanatory
variable.
It should be noted that corruption per se is not necessarily the best
explanatory variable behind ethnic politicization on a country-level. The
overall quality of government or the rule of law could be plausible contenders
without having to remake the entire suggested theory. However, corruption
has the advantage in this study of having a conceptual link between the
individual and aggregated level in a direct way.
Corruption seems to have low explanatory power of ethnic politicization
in non-democratic regimes, such as Eastern Europe in recent history. Cor-
ruption was prevalent also during the Communist era in USSR and SFR Yu-
goslavia, but the ethnic conﬂicts arose after their fall. The process of ethnic
politicization could perhaps depend on the possibility of actors to articulate
ethnic diﬀerences, which should not be the case when the public debate is
controlled. Nationalism is a much less plausible explanation of the fall of
the USSR than economic factors, meaning that the ethnic politicization in
Asia and Eastern Europe during the post-soviet era should be explained by
factors other than just the ethnic composition that also existed before the
fall of the Berlin Wall. The extent of corruption could however perhaps be
used as an explanation in a comparison of the outfall of ethnic politicization
among post-soviet states. One example of this could be the development of
ethnic voting in Georgia during the Rose Revolution in 2003, after which the
corruption in the country was drastically reduced (Worldbank, 2012). In the
early years of Georgian democracy, the extent of ethnic voting was rather
great, according to the deﬁnitions by the Manifesto Project (Krause et al.,
2018). In 1995, 6.84 percent voted for ethnic parties. In 1999, 25.18 percent
voted for ethnic parties, and even in the election that sparked the combat
against corruption, 2003, 18.8 percent of the votes went to ethnic parties.
Since then, the ethnic parties have received 0 percent in every election.
The ﬁndings from this study open up many more topics to investigate.
What is for example the reason of that some autocracies develop ethic politi-
cization, while others do not? Another topic of interest should be a more
quantitative evaluation of how politics and state institutions aﬀect ethnici-
ties and ethnic fractionalization in the very long term. Hobsbawm created a
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very plausible theory of the causal relationship between the two and provided
much evidence in support for the theory, but the statistical comparisons are
absent in his works.
In summary, we have reason to believe that the sense of ethnic identity
has a more institutional explanation than previous thought, and that ethnic
diﬀerences do not lead to corruption and conﬂict by necessity.
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A | Appendices
I
A.1 Descriptive statistics and sources
A.1.1 Country-level studies
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics of country-level analyses
Name Description Observations Mean Min Max Standard
devia-
tion
Source Dataset
name
Ethnic
voting
A calculated score from
the Afrobarometer. See
El Koubi (2016) for method-
ology
95 .1523646 .0287226 .6642144 .1027122
Corruption Bayesian corruption indica-
tor. A composite measure of
the perception of corruption,
made from over 20 surveys
with 80 questions.
95 55.58202 31.82352 68.84654 9.130019 (Teorell et al.,
2019). Orig-
inal source:
(Standaert, 2015)
bci_bci
Ethnic Po-
larization
Index of ethnic polarization
as described in the method
chapter
87 .5212184 .017 .897 .1994286 (Montalvo &
Reynal-Querol,
2005)
Ethnic
Fraction-
alization
Index of ethnic fractionaliza-
tion, involving an index of
racial and lingual character-
istics.
94 .6868416 .255 .930175 .1790953 (Teorell et al.,
2019). Original
source: (Alesina
et al., 2003).
al_ethnic
Population
aged <14
(log)
Total population between
the ages 0 to 14 as a percent-
age of the total population.
95 3.712429 2.939627 3.916642 .171184 (Teorell et al.,
2019). Orig-
inal source:
(Kaufmann,
Kraay, & Mas-
truzzi, 2010)
wdi_pop14
Population
(log)
Total polulation. 95 16.32323 12.20562 19.0412 1.333797 (Teorell et al.,
2019). Orig-
inal source:
(Kaufmann et
al., 2010)
log_pop
GDP/cap
(log)
GDP per capita based on
purchasing power parity.
95 7.899128 6.474549 9.95715 .8715598 (Teorell et al.,
2019). Orig-
inal source:
(Kaufmann et
al., 2010)
log_gdp2
Democracy Polity measure ranging from
-10 (strongly autocratic) to
+10 (strongly democratic).
95 5.157895 -4 10 3.579837 (Teorell et al.,
2019). Orig-
inal source:
(Marshall, Jag-
gers, & Gurr,
2018)
p_polity2
Education
level (log)
One of the three sub-
categories in the human
development index. Con-
sists of eight indicators from
ﬁve diﬀerent sources.
95 3.865133 3.277145 4.446175 .2654298 (Teorell et al.,
2019). Orig-
inal source:
(Foundation,
2017)
iiag_edu
II
Years of
democ-
racy (log)
Calculated uninterrupted
years of democracy, deﬁned
as a value above 0 in the
polity2-scale.
95 2.240244 0 4.26268 1.221612
Press free-
dom
Measures the press freedom
in the country, and the ef-
forts made by the govern-
ment to see to that press
freedom is respected.
94 25.01085 5.5 54 10.39274 (Teorell et al.,
2019). Original
source: (Borders,
2018)
rsf_pﬁ
Civil soci-
ety inter-
est groups
To what extent is there a
network of cooperative asso-
ciations or interest groups to
mediate between society and
the political system? Data
available every second year
2005-2017, so the 2007 value
is used for Afrobarometer
round 3, and the 2015 value
is used for Afrobaromater
round 6.
88 5.613636 2 10 1.578824 (Teorell et al.,
2019). Original
source: (Stiftung,
2018)
bti_ig
Uneven
economic
develop-
ment
Includes measures related to
the GINI coeﬃcient, the in-
come share of the top and
bottom 10%, slum popula-
tion, etc.
92 7.673913 3.5 9.7 .9829167 (Teorell et al.,
2019). Original
source: (Haken
et al., 2015)
ﬀp_ued
Internet
access
Share of population who
have used the internet dur-
ing the last 3 moths.
95 13.3147 .3844893 58.27124 14.3402 (Teorell et al.,
2019). Orig-
inal source:
(Kaufmann et
al., 2010)
wdi_internet
III
A.1.2 Individual level study
Below are to begin with the deﬁnitions of the variables used in the study.
Then follows descriptive statistics of the variables. All data is taken from
Afrobarometer round 6 unless speciﬁed otherwise (Bratton et al., 2015).
Partifrak: ethnic fractionalization in the party of choice, as calculated from
the Afrobarometer data. See chapter 3 for a closer description of the measure.
Corruption perception: index about perception of corruption composed
by answers to the following questions in Afrobarometer:
Q53A: How many of the following people do you think are involved in
corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The Presi-
dent* and Oﬃcials in his Oﬃce? *or prime minister, depending on the most
powerful leadership role
Q53B: How many of the following people do you think are involved in
corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Members of
Parliament?
Q53C: How many of the following people do you think are involved in
corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Government
Oﬃcials?
Q53D: How many of the following people do you think are involved in cor-
ruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Local government
councilors?
Q53E: How many of the following people do you think are involved in
corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Police?
Q53F: How many of the following people do you think are involved in
corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Tax Oﬃcials
(e.g. Ministry of Finance oﬃcials or Local Government tax collectors)
Q53G: How many of the following people do you think are involved in
corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Judges and
Magistrates?
More state: index about the economic relation between the individual and
the state, composed by answers to the following questions:
Q26E: For each of the following actions, please tell me whether you think
it is something a good -citizen in a democracy should always do, never do,
or do only if they choose: Pay taxes they owe to government 1=Never do
2=Do only if they choose 3= Always do
Q44: Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose
Statement 1 or Statement 2. Statement 1: Citizens must pay their taxes
to the government in order for our country to develop. Statement 2: The
government can ﬁnd enough resources for development from other sources
without having to tax the people. 1=Agree very strongly with Statement
IV
1, 2=Agree with Statement 1, 3=Agree with Statement 2, 4=Agree very
strongly with Statement 2, 5=Agree with neither
Q65C: If the government decided to make people pay more taxes or user
fees in order to increase spending on public health care, would you support
this decision or oppose it? 1=Strongly oppose, 2=Somewhat oppose, 3=Nei-
ther support nor oppose, 4=Somewhat support, 5=Strongly support , 6=It
depends (e.g., on size of the increase)
More authoritarian: composed by the following variables:
Q16: Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose
Statement 1or Statement 2. Statement 1: Government should be able to
ban any organization that goes against its policies. Statement 2: We should
be able to join any organization, whether or not the government approves
of it. 1=Agree very strongly with Statement 1, 2=Agree with Statement
1, 3=Agree with Statement 2, 4=Agree very strongly with Statement 2,
5=Agree with neither
Q30: Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?
Statement 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.
Statement 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be
preferable. Statement 3: For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind
of government we have. 1=Statement 3: Doesn't matter, 2=Statement 2:
Sometimes non-democratic preferable, 3=Statement 1: Democracy prefer-
able
Q33: Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose
Statement 1 or Statement 2. Statement 1: Political parties create division
and confusion; it is therefore unnecessary to have many political parties in
[ENTER COUNTRY]. Statement 2: Many political parties are needed to
make sure that [ENTER NATIONALITY] have real choices in who governs
them. 1=Agree very strongly with Statement 1, 2=Agree with Statement
1, 3=Agree with Statement 2, 4=Agree very strongly with Statement 2,
5=Agree with neither
Level of democracy: Polity measure ranging from -10 (strongly auto-
cratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). p_polity2 in Teorell et al. (2019).
Original source: (Marshall et al., 2018)
GDP per capita (log): GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity.
Log-transform applied, because of skewness of distribution. wdi_gdppppcur
in Teorell et al. (2019). Original source: (Kaufmann et al., 2010)
Control of Corruption: country-level measure of perception of corrup-
tion. wbgi_cce in Teorell et al. (2019). Original source: (Kaufmann et al.,
2010)
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics of individual-level analysis
asdf num mean min max sd
Party fractionalization 32,472 .7203501 0 .9489706 .2140973
Perception of corruption 24,829 .4783423 0 1 .2267099
More state 31,928 .3507315 0 1 .1019617
More authoritarian 28,643 .3060754 0 1 .2395673
Democracy 32,472 5.141907 -4 10 3.513579
Corruption 31,280 -.5723053 -1.30416 .9495435 .5039418
GDP/cap (log) 32,472 6689.129 796.9608 60028.93 10606.51
In table A.2 we can see the descriptive statistics of the variables
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A.2 Histograms
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Figure A.1: Histograms of the used variables in the country-level regression
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Figure A.2: Histograms of the used variables in the instrument variable
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A.3 Regression diagnostics
A.3.1 Multicolinearity
In table A.3, we can observe that the level of democracy and the years of
democracy are above the rule-of-thumb value of 5, which is likely as the years
of democracy is built based on the continuity of the democracy variable.
After the removal of years of democracy, we observe no values above 5, as
seen in table A.4
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Figure A.3: Histograms of the used variables in the individual study
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Table A.3: Multicolinearity scores
Variable VIF 1/VIF
Democracy 7.88 0.126868
Years of democracy (log) 7.62 0.131229
Population aged <14 (log) 4.71 0.212234
GDP/cap (log) 3.83 0.260910
Education Level (log) 2.94 0.339569
Corruption 2.26 0.443317
Population (log) 1.63 0.612461
Ethnic fractionalization 1.62 0.617845
Ethnic polarization 1.47 0.679140
Mean VIF 3.77
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Table A.4: Multicolinearity scores after removal of years of democracy
Variable VIF 1/VIF
Population aged <14 (log) 4.67 0.214109
GDP/cap (log) 3.48 0.287638
Education Level (log) 2.92 0.342560
Corruption 2.23 0.449107
Ethnic fractionalization 1.59 0.627504
Population (log) 1.55 0.643733
Ethnic polarization 1.44 0.693241
Democracy 1.31 0.762704
Mean VIF 2.40
Table A.5: Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
Heteroskedasticity 29.00 28 0.4125
Skewness 8.00 9 0.5341
Kurtosis 4.32 1 0.0377
Total 41.32 38 0.3277
A.3.2 Heteroskedasticity
Table A.5 and A.6 indicates that the data has problems with heteroskedas-
ticity.
Table A.6: Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity
chi2(1) = 5.57
Prob >chi2 = 0.0183
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Table A.7: Robustness check after removal of observations with Cook's D
>(4/29)
Ethnic voting 1 2 3 4
Corruption .0037865 .0047903 .0044162 .0041257
(0-100)
Ethnic Fractionalization -.0384626 .057935 .082352
(0-1)
Ethnic Polarization .1890546 .2038748 .1966765
(0-1)
GDP/cap (log) .0170704 .0213259 .0207112 .0079682
Population (log) -.0014763 .0036667 .0033815 -.0003543
Democracy .0184887 .0184887 .0205195 .0072989
(-10 - 10)
Population aged <14 (log) -.3531562 -.3531562 -.2929778 -.2715339
Education level (log) -.2108935 -.1799603 -.1775067 -.161079
Years of democracy (log) -.043453 -.049494 -.0474234
R-squared between 0.3484 0.4679 0.4734 0.4207
Adj. R-squared 0.0587 0.2315 0.1946 0.1632
No. Observations 82 82 82 82
No. Groups 27 27 27 27
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
A.4 Robustness checks
A.4.1 OLS regression
In addition to the levels in table A.7 and A.8, there are no Cook's D values
below 1.
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Table A.8: Robustness check after removal of observations with Cook's D
>(4/87)
Ethnic voting 1 2 3 4
Corruption .0084062** .0081524*** .0085195*** .0088965***
(0-100)
Ethnic Fractionalization -.1511772 -.0694883 -.0378287
(0-1)
Ethnic Polarization .1996643*** .1846588** .1823253**
(0-1)
GDP/cap (log) .0166598 .0110051 .0096512 -.0028314
Population (log) -.0127952 -.0066131 -.0050089 -.0099064
Democracy .0199551* .0196684** .02134** .0101585**
(-10 - 10)
Population aged <14 (log) -.3736565** -.3373488*** -.3319749*** -.3235353**
Education level (log) -.183181* -.1338297* -.1386934* -.0953115
Years of democracy (log) -.0382837 -.0358743 -.0398984*
R-squared between 0.7481 0.8810 0.8909 0.8463
Adj. R-squared 0.6042 0.8130 0.8153 0.7585
No. Observations 77 77 77 77
No. Groups 23 23 23 23
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
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Table A.9: Robustness check after correction for heteroskedasticity
Ethnic voting 1 2 3 4
Corruption .0076363 .0094999 .0098654* .0097033*
(0-100)
Ethnic Fractionalization -.2090225 -.1826156* -.1755893
(0-1)
Ethnic Polarization .2528366** .2261576 .2185054*
(0-1)
GDP/cap (log) -.0077236 -.0331359 -.0182986 -.0237249
Population (log) -.0096163 -.00308 .0031011 .0011554
Democracy .0071424 .0150641 .0175063 .0117114
(-10 - 10)
Population aged <14 (log) -.2243099 -.336123** -.2671908** -.2584668
Education level (log) -.0869075 -.0344004 -.0652779 -.0598282
Years of democracy (log) .0074728 -.0124397 -.0207352
R-squared 0.2647 0.3574 0.4054 0.4008
Adj. R-squared -0.0027 0.1004 0.1238
No. Observations 94 87 87 87
No. Groups 31 29 29 29
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
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A.4.2 Instrumental variable regression
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A.5 Ethnic voting scores
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Table A.11: Calculated ethnic voting scores from Afrobarometer 3-6
Round
Country 3 4 5 6
Algeria 0.1743349
Benin 0.1341196 0.1577043 0.160517 0.172181
Botswana 0.0518673 0.0535502 0.0520464 0.0451351
Burkina Faso 0.2361726 0.1623485 0.1213898
Burundi 0.6642144
Cameroon 0.0945853 0.0795054
Cape Verde 0.2319027 0.1787482 0.108141
Cote d'Ivoire 0.5151948 0.2578199
Gabon 0.1460714
Ghana 0.2187126 0.2081557 0.2350929 0.2393313
Guinea 0.3597646 0.3657575
Kenya 0.1084234 0.1954245 0.1492057 0.2112517
Lesotho 0.0999087 0.0671755 0.0451729 0.0406236
Liberia 0.0602237 0.0710765 0.0397666
Madagascar 0.0998412 0.1110948 0.0738843 0.080418
Malawi 0.128453 0.1561377 0.1151922 0.1369964
Mali 0.0322842 0.0415885 0.0536527 0.0681547
Mauritius 0.3188097 0.2700564
Morocco 0.1585895
Mozambique 0.2036528 0.156498 0.1201208 0.1711715
Namibia 0.2777414 0.2922999 0.2903441 0.2713821
Niger 0.1595229 0.2193528
Nigeria 0.1329415 0.0938054 0.1310653 0.143357
Sao Tome and Principe 0.3327368
Senegal 0.1903325 0.139003 0.1161529 0.1339343
Sierra Leone 0.2800359 0.27438
South Africa 0.136182 0.1080908 0.1369537 0.1079517
Tanzania 0.1127852 0.0623846 0.0287226 0.0407626
Togo 0.1142364 0.0938591
Uganda 0.093046 0.0671997 0.0589902 0.0842157
Zambia 0.1015217 0.0982467 0.1070491 0.1108115
Zimbabwe 0.1335044 0.0812928 0.109229
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A.6 Instrumental variable checklist
Below is a checklist for appropriate use of instrumental variables in politi-
cal science, created by Sovey and Green (2011), that will be applied on the
choice of instrumental variables in this study.
What is the estimand? The estimand is perception of corruption, which
is not an exact measure of the true extent of corruption. Press freedom,
internet access and civil society interest groups could have a gatekeeping
function against corruption, if corrupt practices have a larger chance of be-
ing detected. But the use of internet and news media could also contribute to
the access to information regarding corruption, which should have an eﬀect
on corruption perception even with constant levels of corrupt practices.
It has been rather hard to compare the composition of this instrumen-
tal variable to that of others, just because most accessible studies that use
corruption as an instrumental variable use ethnic fractionalization as an in-
strument (Gupta, Davoodi, & Alonso-Terme, 2002; Mauro, 1998; De Jong
& Bogmans, 2011; Esarey & Schwindt-Bayer, 2019).
Is the instrumental variable independent of the potential outcomes?
There could be reason to question the homogeneity of the causal eﬀect. Inter-
net access, press freedom and the extent of civil society interest group could
all be related to practices of grand corruption. However, news media, social
media or action groups would probably have little interest in the average per-
sons wrongdoings, i.e. petty corruption. Also Uslaner (2008) suggests that,
although petty corruption might be correlated with inequality, inequality is
a much better suited explanation for grand corruption.
This might however relate to another fundamental issue of the research
design, namely that a more speciﬁc measure of grand corruption could be
better suited as a means to explain the causal link between perception of
corruption and ethnic voting.
Explain why it is plausible to believe that the instrumental vari-
able is unrelated to unmeasured causes of the dependent variable.
The two issues I have aimed to address here are both the case of a reverse
causality, i.e. that ethnic voting causes corruption. The second issue I have
aimed to avoid are that the independent variables could be systematically
related to unobserved causes of the dependent variable. I have identiﬁed the
greatest risk here to be if variables related to ethnic divisions, such as ethnic
fractionalization or ethnic polarization, are both causing ethnic voting and
corruption.
For both reasons, I have regarded variables caused by corruption as un-
ﬁtting, as they hypothetically could be aﬀected by a corruption that is in
turn aﬀected by either ethnic voting or e.g. ethnic fractionalization.
Press freedom has a potential weakness, which is that countries with
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a higher degree of corruption could also be more prone to censorship and
state-owned journalism. A decrease of press freedom in a country could also
be a reaction to journalistic investigations of corrupt political elites, that
can, in turn, be theorized to be the consequence of ethnic fractionalization.
However, if we consider that many European countries have had a relatively
high degree of press freedom for two hundred years, it seems as if press
freedom could be somewhat resilient to changes in levels of corruption.
The relationship between corruption and civil society interest groups
could be that a decrease in corruption is correlated with other measures,
such as GDP per capita or welfare, that could be preconditions for civic
participation in interest groups. Another explanation could be that corrupt
countries are more autocratic, and therefore persecute interest groups to a
higher degree. However, the measure is not of the freedom of interest groups,
but of the mere existence of them. The emergence of e.g. the labor movement
in Europe during the 19th century also points towards that a high degree of
spare time and money are not necessary preconditions for the formation of
civil society interest groups.
A well-functioning internet infrastructure should be a precondition for in-
ternet access, and the construction of such an infrastructure could be helped
from the absence of corruption, meaning that a decrease in corruption could
lead to an increase in internet access. However, an investigation of this rela-
tionship points towards that the absence of corruption does not seem to be
a precondition for well-functioning internet infrastructure, as many corrupt
countries that neighbor countries with fast internet speeds, seem to take
advantage of that themselves (Bernhardsson, 2015). If this is true, internet
access should ﬁrst and foremost be an issue of being able to purchase a smart
phone, and phone prices are steadily decreasing.
For the last measure, uneven economic development, a plausible other
explanation could be that ethnic fractionalization leads to corruption, that
leads to uneven economic development. Here, I would, however, suggest a
historical materialist approach, i.e., the development of productive forces
and the production relations are the main determinants of the uneven dis-
tribution of growth. These materialist causes are in turn blind to ethnicities.
Suppose an instrumental variable is deemed exogenous because it
is random or near random. Are the exclusion restrictions valid? It
is plausible to believe that the instrumental variable could have direct eﬀect
on the outcome, but most plausible explanations would rather point towards
that the instrumental variable should increase the value of the dependant
variable, and such an eﬀect has not been measured.
A plausible path from press freedom to ethnic voting is a greater extent
of the ethnic press, that could lead to ethnic, political mobilization. In this
case, press freedom should be positively correlated with ethnic voting, but
the measures are very uncorrelated. A possible explanation of this is that
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press freedom could lead to a higher degree of journalistic professionalization,
as the pressure to be regime-friendly should decrease. This should, in turn,
mean more impartial news coverage.
A plausible path from internet access to ethnic voting would be a higher
degree of fake news and new forms of ethnic mobilization. Another could be
that the internet community creates a higher degree of trust between ethnic
groups, which would decrease ethnic voting. However, neither is internet
directly access correlated with ethnic voting
A plausible path from civil society interest groups to ethnic voting would
be if a higher degree of civil society would lead to a greater extent of ethnic
interest groups, that could increase ethnic political mobilization. If this were
the case, these measures would be positively correlated, but there is almost
no correlation at all between the two in the used dataset.
Are the instruments weak? As we will see in the results section, the
F-value is slightly above 10, where instrumental variables with an F-value
could be considered as weak as a rule of thumb (Sovey & Green, 2011). Also,
the Hansen J statistic and Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic are within the sug-
gested bounds.
Does the instrumental variable have a monotonic eﬀect on the
treatment? Both press freedom and internet access have theoretical maxi-
mums. It is plausible that the eﬀect of increased press freedom and internet
access will decrease with higher values of the variable, if we hypothesize in-
formation about corruption as a form of disease, where internet users and
newspaper readers are vectors that infect their surroundings with relevant
information.
It is also plausible that both inequality and civil society interest groups
have threshold eﬀects, where e.g. some inequality might be seen as justiﬁed,
which can obstruct forms of corruption, or that a handful civil society inter-
est groups are manageable for a corrupt regime.
Are the observations subject to spillover eﬀects? I do at least hypoth-
esize that internet access can be a spilled over from neighboring countries
with a high degree of internet access. I do not exclude that the other instru-
ments can be subject to spillover eﬀects, but these will probably be more
subtle and indirect.
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